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TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA
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20 MARCH 1974


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
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ARAB-ISRAELI ISSUE

MOSCOW SKEPTICAL OF "REORIENTATION" IN U.S. MIDEAST POLICY

Comment in PRAVDA's international review on the 17th continues to reflect Soviet pique over the publicity for U.S. diplomatic achievements in the region. The review's author, Kolesnichenko, debunked "sensational" U.S. press articles on American diplomatic triumphs in the area, saying that "the mountain had labored and brought forth a mouse."* Two weeks previously, a panelist on Moscow radio's observers' roundtable had expressed disagreement with Western press assessments that Kissinger was bringing about a settlement through personal diplomacy. And Kolesnichenko himself, in a broadcast to North America on the 12th, had set forth arguments he subsequently repeated in PRAVDA: Despite the claims of "certain observers," he had said, Kissinger's visits to the area had given no evidence of a reorientation in U.S. policy, since Washington was continuing its economic and military support of Israel. Conceding that the Secretary was "full of energy" on some issues, Kolesnichenko had said that partial measures such as disengagement, which the USSR supports, were no substitute for an overall settlement embodying total Israeli withdrawal.

Kolesnichenko's skepticism that there had been a change in Washington's Mideast policy was echoed in a Rassadin commentary broadcast in several languages on the 18th. Rassadin also pointed to U.S. press comment on diplomatic successes in the Middle East and wondered rhetorically what changes in U.S. policy were evident when the United States was continuing its aid to Israel.

Soviet leaders in recent speeches have not gone beyond platitudes in remarks on the Middle East. Kosygin, speaking at a dinner for the visiting Norwegian prime minister on the 18th, reiterated the standard position that peace should be achieved through complete Israeli withdrawal and insuring the Palestinians' "national rights." Brezhnev, in his 15 March speech in Alma-Ata, touched on the Middle East only in passing in commenting on his recent talks with Pompidou.

* Arabic-language versions of the PRAVDA review item broadcast by Moscow radio and by Radio Peace and Progress gave different renderings of the "mountain/mouse" metaphor. Radio Peace and Progress described U.S. press claims of American diplomatic victories as deluded, and the Moscow radio version, while partially indistinct at that point, seemed to be in the same vein.

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Soviet media have continued to avoid direct criticism of Kissinger's diplomatic activity, but Moscow's frustration over its diminishing voice in Arab counsels is suggested by its defensive protestations concerning the importance of Soviet-Arab cooperation and by its expressions of concern over U.S. influence in Egypt. Commentators have repeatedly declared that disengagement is only the first step, and they have expressed concern that Israel may seek to freeze the process once disengagement has been achieved.

NIXON STATEMENTS Soviet media have selectively reported President Nixon's remarks on the Middle East in his recent public appearances, singling out his statements in support of detente. TASS in its report of the President's remarks before the National Association of Broadcasters in Houston on the 19th highlighted his "emphasis" on the major role of Soviet-U.S. cooperation in insuring permanent peace in the Middle East. The account noted that the President expected the Middle East would be high on the agenda of his talks with Brezhnev later this year. TASS did not mention Nixon's reference to an alleged Soviet obstructionist attitude in the Middle East, or his observation that Soviet and U.S. interests in the region "are not always the same." Reporting the President's appearance at the Executive Club in Chicago on the 15th, TASS quoted him as saying that the policy of detente had prevented "serious disagreements" between the USSR and the United States in the Middle East from leading to a military confrontation.

TASS reported the President as saying in his 6 March news conference that while Syrian-Israeli disengagement was an even more difficult problem than Egyptian-Israeli disengagement, "we have secured Syrian and Israeli agreement" to come to Washington in two weeks to discuss the question. But TASS did not mention the President's subsequent remark that the United States would use its influence "just as strongly as we can with both parties" to get disengagement on the Syrian front as quickly as possible. Soviet media have apparently not picked up U.S. press reports on the 17th and 18th that Secretary Kissinger plans a fifth trip to the Middle East around 20 April to try to expedite disengagement on the Golan front.

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ENERGY

MOSCOW AMBIVALENT ON LIFTING OF ARAB OIL EMBARGO

Although a 17 March PRAVDA article had praised the Arab oil embargo as an effective diplomatic instrument, the lifting of the embargo by the Arab oil ministers the next day was reported by Soviet domestic media with little editorial comment. Moscow Arabic-language broadcasts, by contrast, were more tendentious, pointing out that the embargo had been a "just" measure and might be reimposed in the future.

TASS and the Moscow domestic service carried only brief and fragmentary reports of the 18 March embargo decision by Arab oil ministers in Vienna. TASS dispatches from Vienna noted the "immediate" ending of the embargo but failed to report that the decision would be reviewed in three months. The dispatches indicated that the decision was not unanimous and reported the Syrian reasons for abstaining; the provisional nature of Algeria's approval was also reported. TASS did not mention that the statement issued in Vienna by the Arab ministers cited evidence of "a new dimension" in U.S. policy as a reason for the decision. As late as 16 March Moscow reportage had seemed to reflect doubt that the embargo would be lifted, and it had quoted sources saying the decision would be postponed until the meeting of Arab foreign ministers on 25 March.

As in the past, Moscow radio Arabic-language broadcasts have been more partisan in their comment on the oil issue. A commentary broadcast on the 19th maintained that the Arab decision to review the situation at a Cairo meeting of oil ministers on 1 June indicated that U.S. pressure on the Arabs had not been completely successful. The commentary added that the Vienna meeting had demonstrated that the Arab countries would not forget the important role oil could play in the future "as a political weapon."

Moscow has reported factually but devoted little attention to the decision of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries to maintain the oil price at the previous level during the second quarter of 1974; a broadcast in Persian said the decision not to lower the price was based on the failure of the West to reduce the rate of inflation. In commenting on the meeting of the Western energy coordinating group in Brussels on 13-14 March, an article in PRAVDA, according to TASS on the 19th, stressed continuing differences between the EC and the United States concerning relations with the oil-producing countries. The EC decision to enter into direct talks with the Arab countries "struck a telling blow" at U.S. efforts to maintain a unified Western position, PRAVDA was quoted as saying.

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EAST EUROPEANS CONCERNED OVER POSSIBLE SOVIET OIL PRICE RISE

The East European media's cautious treatment of the oil price question appears to reflect some doubt that Soviet oil will continue to be made available to Moscow's allies at prices well below the current world market level. At the same time there is an implication that Moscow itself is dissatisfied with its long-term agreements to deliver such low-cost oil to East Europe in the fact that monitored Moscow media have ceased giving assurances on oil prices and have not sustained any concerted propaganda campaign to praise these agreements in the current period.

East European media have continued to praise the supplies of low-cost Soviet oil, while preparing their populations for the effects of future possible increases in Soviet oil prices by underscoring the pressures exerted on the East European economies by rising "world market" prices for petroleum. This approach was exemplified in Poland's announcement on 19 January of increased prices for petroleum products.

On the same day that Warsaw announced higher fuel prices, a Moscow radio commentary for Hungarian and Slovak listeners had explicitly assured them that while the USSR delivers oil to capitalist countries at world market prices, it "is delivering oil to the fraternal countries at stable prices, that is, at prices valid when the long-term agreements were concluded." The commentary added that "thus internationalism is proved in practice." Such Moscow assurances, fairly common in the early days of rapid oil price rises, have disappeared in recent Moscow treatment of this issue.

EAST GERMANY Currently, of Moscow's allies the GDR media have reflected most prominently a preoccupation with the availability of low-cost petroleum. Thus, in a 12 March press conference at the Leipzig Spring Fair, GDR Foreign Trade Minister Soelle reiterated the assurance that oil deliveries from the Soviet Union, which accounted for 90 percent of the GDR's oil imports, were at "stable prices based on long-term agreements." Three days earlier the "International Information" program carried by the East Berlin domestic service on the 9th had sidestepped a listener's question as to whether increased oil prices on the world market meant "that the GDR has to pay more for oil purchased from the Soviet Union." After reiterating the stock theme that Soviet oil deliveries are not subject to market price fluctuations, the broadcast added that while, "in general," the GDR does not push world market prices onto its population, "the enormous rises in raw material prices make great demands on our economy."

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A month earlier, the same East Berlin radio program on 9 February went to considerable lengths to explain Poland's January increases in fuel prices, answering a listener's query on this score with the remark by its commentator that "I don't want to sound sarcastic, but the astonishment you express [about the Polish price rise] only goes to prove how rare price increases are in the socialist countries."

POLAND In announcing a sizeable increase in fuel prices, Polish Premier Jaroszewicz explained in a Sejm speech on 19 January that gasoline prices in Poland had remained unchanged for about 12 years, adding that these prices had been "comparatively low." Jaroszewicz went on to point out that the Soviet Union provides 75 percent of Poland's oil, the price of which would "remain unchanged until the end of the present five-year period"--a price-fixing system which "protects the CEMA countries from the most serious effects of the oil and energy crisis in the capitalist world." He added, however, that while Poland's "basic oil needs" are met by Soviet deliveries, its gasoline, motor oil, and lubricants are procured "in practice" from nonsocialist countries. Warsaw had announced gasoline rationing on 24 November.

Polish media predictably have not picked up remarks in a 4 March Washington POST interview by Polish State Planning Commission Deputy Chairman Chylinski, who acknowledged that the USSR currently is suffering substantial losses due to the CEMA long-term price-fixing agreements and predicted that Moscow would "try to change" these built-in safeguards against sudden price increases.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA, Prague and Budapest media have been largely
HUNGARY silent on the oil price issue in the recent period, after stressing earlier this year the orthodox line that deliveries from the USSR largely protected these countries from the high prices and shortages suffered in capitalist countries. At the same time these statements were hedged: Budapest's NEPSZABADSAG on 17 January had noted that "however, as 10-12 percent of Hungarian oil imports come from the third world, their price increases in oil strain the state budget." And Czechoslovak Deputy Foreign Trade Minister Peter declared in PRACE on 30 January that, while "all" of his country's "present" fuel requirements were met by the USSR, the increased speed of the development of the Czechoslovak economy "will necessitate the purchase of an additional amount of oil from developing countries in the near future."

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MTI on 16 February and CTK on the 19th carried statements hailing the agreement on construction of the Adriatic oil pipeline which these two countries had recently signed with Belgrade. The projected pipeline, which is to deliver Middle East oil to the three participating countries through the Yugoslav port of Rijeka, is scheduled for completion in 1977.

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EAST-WEST RELATIONS

MOSCOW CITES NIXON SPEECH AS SIGN OF U.S.-EUROPE RIFT

In comment pegged to President Nixon's criticism of the EC in his 15 March Chicago speech, Moscow and its East European allies have drawn a picture of growing crisis in the West brought about by U.S. efforts to dictate policies to Western Europe. Couched mainly in generalities, Soviet comment has largely avoided the most dramatic element in the speech--the President's implied warning that U.S. willingness to underwrite West Europe's defense could be eroded by the EC's continued fractiousness on political and economic issues. Capitalizing on the recent Pompidou visit to the USSR, Moscow has sought to contrast its own "cooperative" attitude toward West European countries with the abrasive relationship said to characterize the current state of U.S.-European relations.

U.S.-EUROPE RIFT Moscow's initial treatment of the President's speech was moderate and reportorial. Several TASS and Moscow radio items on the 16th highlighted the President's stress on the importance and desirability of continuing the process of U.S.-Soviet detente. These early items stated that the President had also "admitted" that sharp differences over political and economic policies had arisen between the United States and West Europe.

Subsequent Soviet comment was more polemical in tone and cited articles in the U.S. and West European press to portray the Atlantic Alliance as in the throes of profound crisis. A report on 17 March by TASS correspondent Chernyshev, for instance, reviewed and quoted selectively from a wide range of critical comment in the U.S. press. Other commentators, such as A. Zholkver, speaking over Moscow radio on 18 March, sought to present recent developments in U.S.-West European relations within a larger framework of "imperialist rivalries and contradictions typical of the capitalist world." On 19 March TASS commentator V. Goncharov characterized these relations as subject to "periodic aggravation," with the most recent flare-up of tension unique only in its acrimony.

TROOP WITHDRAWALS The Goncharov commentary is so far the only direct Soviet comment on the President's reference to maintenance of U.S. forces in Europe. Asserting that "Washington made a threat" to withdraw its troops from West Europe if Europe refused to follow U.S. policy, Goncharov cited the London SUNDAY TELEGRAPH as saying that "this traditional threat" did not

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work this time. He added, ascribing the opinion to French Foreign Minister Jobert and "others," that it is the United States and not West Europe that is interested in keeping U.S. troops in Europe. Jobert's actual words, as broadcast on 8 March, were: "I want U.S. forces to be kept in Europe. Having said that . . . after all, the maintenance of forces is in no way a fundamental matter for France, but is for the United States."

East European comment has generally been more explicit in discussing the President's remarks and more varied in its interpretation than Soviet comment. Budapest radio, for instance, while asserting on 16 March that the speech contained a "threat to withdraw military cooperation in retaliation for economic competition," also expressed the opinion that such a threat could not be taken seriously because the U.S. military presence in Europe is basic to U.S. global strategy and "not a favor conferred on Western Europe." An East German radio broadcast on 18 March argued that the U.S.-EC conflict was in essence an economic problem, and that "Washington intends to turn its military presence in West Europe into an instrument of blackmail" to compel compliance with its policies.

POMPIDOU VISIT In depicting a state of disarray in U.S.-West European relations, Moscow has also sought to develop an explicit contrast with the USSR's own professed policy of advocating broad-based collaboration throughout Europe--"the Europe of more than thirty states," "the genuine Europe, not a truncated and maimed Europe." In this context Moscow has hailed the 12-13 March visit of French President Pompidou to the USSR, as well as Soviet-French relations in general, as exemplifying the good will, mutual understanding, and spirit of cooperation upon which relations between states should be based. Although the Pompidou visit ended without a final communique, Moscow has praised the visit as a "working meeting" that was an "important success" and has quoted approvingly from a brief and vague "official report" on the meeting.* In the weekly Moscow radio observers roundtable on 17 March, A. Druzhinin characterized world opinion as viewing the Pompidou visit as "the most important political event of the week." On the same program NOVOSTI observer S. Beglov added that the visit is being analyzed against the background of "the situation now developing in Europe" and "the polemics now occurring on both sides of the Atlantic over the future of Western policy and the nature of relations between the partners and rivals within Western alliances."

* Although the Soviets described a previous meeting between Pompidou and Brezhnev in Minsk on 11-12 January 1973 as "unofficial," a "joint communique" was nevertheless issued at the conclusion of the talks.

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WORLD COMMUNISM

MOSCOW LINKS DETENTE POLICY WITH WORLD COMMUNIST GOALS

In a major editorial article in the February issue of the Soviet party's organizational journal, PARTY LIFE, Moscow has argued that its policy of peaceful coexistence is an indispensable condition for the successful pursuit of world communist goals. Addressed ostensibly to charges raised against Soviet policy by an obscure Spanish communist party official, the article is, in fact, a major statement of Soviet policy on world communist strategy.* As such, it can be read both as a Soviet response to the divergences over strategy which made themselves evident at the recent Brussels meeting of West European communist parties, and as the Soviet party platform on the question of whether a new world conference of communist parties should be called and what it should aim to achieve. That the article was intended to have major impact in the communist world is indicated by the fact that it was broadcast in many languages to both Europe and Asia.

The article devoted major attention to the charge that peaceful coexistence is inimical to revolutionary change because it acts to freeze the existing political and social structures in the world and, thus, to ratify the status quo. Responding that peaceful coexistence is a form of the "class struggle," the article argued that the Soviet Union's policy had, in fact, led to the victory of progressive forces in many parts of the world. It cited as examples the favorable outcomes of the conflicts in Vietnam, the Middle East, and Bangladesh. In more general terms, it argued that the policy of peaceful coexistence serves to create the conditions which enable indigenous forces to effect progressive changes. It labeled as a "false thesis" the contention that there is a contradiction in this regard between the interests of the Soviet state and the interests of the world communist movement.

The article also addressed the issue of China's position in the communist movement and the stance that other communist parties

* The Spanish official is M. Azcarate, member of the Executive Committee of the Spanish Communist party, and his charges are contained in a report to the Central Committee published in the Spanish party's theoretical journal NUESTRA BANDERA, No. 72, 1973.

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should take in this regard. Divergent attitudes toward this issue had emerged at the Brussels meeting, with French CP leader Marchais attacking the Chinese leadership, and Italian CP leader Berlinguer carefully avoiding the subject. Asserting that the Soviet Union had always stood ready to resolve issues with the Chinese, the article labeled as a "crude attack" the charge that the Soviet Union had taken no initiatives to overcome the tensions that had arisen between the two parties. It described as a repetition of "Chinese lies" the assertion that the PRC had pursued a course of "realism" in foreign policy by developing good relations with other governments as a means, allegedly, of offsetting the "military pressure" and policy of "encirclement" applied against it by Moscow.

On the linked issue of the expediency and prospective focus of a new world conference of communist parties, the article disputed the argument that the time was "inappropriate" for such a meeting. It noted that this Spanish argument was based in part on the contention that the CPSU would insist on "ideological cohesion" in such a meeting and that this would "cancel out" the trend toward independence in the communist movement that had developed in recent years. Dismissing the concept of a "single center" in the communist movement as a myth, the article nevertheless went on to argue that the concept of independence in the communist world meant adherence to a "class" position--and that such a position necessarily involved a willingness by communist parties to cooperate at the international level. While disputing the Spanish arguments against the convening of a world conference, the article stopped short of affirming Moscow's own support for such a gathering. Indeed, it warned against treating the conference "as though it were a fait accompli," noting that it had so far been advocated "only by a number of parties."

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INDOCHINA

SIHANOUK VISITS LAOS, AFFIRMS STANCE ON CAMBODIAN SETTLEMENT

Cambodian Prince Sihanouk's 11-15 March official visit to the Lao liberated area occasioned a round of speeches by Sihanouk and Lao Patriotic Front Chairman Souphanouvong and a 15 March joint communique that duly testified to the permanence of Indochinese unity in their struggles against the United States. The activities of Sihanouk and his entourage, the highest-level RGNU delegation to ever visit Sam Neua, followed the pattern set during visits there by North Vietnamese First Secretary Le Duan in November 1973 and PRG Advisory Council Chairman Nguyen Huu Tho last January. Both sides expressed appreciation for past mutual support, lauded the Indochinese peace agreements as victories against the United States, pledged continued support for persistent struggles until complete liberation, and recorded "complete identity of views" in the communique.

As usual, the visit was not publicized until after Sihanouk had safely departed Laos. NCNA on the 16th disclosed that Sihanouk had left Canton for Laos via Hanoi on the 9th. Various communist media reported that he had arrived in Laos on the 11th, and broadcast speeches by Sihanouk and Souphanouvong at an 11 March reception, a banquet on the 12th, a meeting on the 13th, and a farewell banquet the following evening. The joint communique was released by Pathet Lao media on 19 March. After leaving Laos, Sihanouk stopped in Hanoi on 16-19 March and returned to Canton on the 19th.

SIHANOUK REMARKS Sihanouk's statements in Laos provide the most authoritative overview of the situation in Cambodia by a Front spokesman since late last year. Consistent with Front media's recent restraint in evaluating prospects for the ongoing dry season offensive, Sihanouk carefully sidestepped predictions of the Lon Nol regime's imminent collapse, merely asserting in the joint communique that the liberation armed forces have surrounded Phnom Penh and are in the process of launching "decisive and thunderous assaults" to overthrow the regime. In his speech on the 12th the prince pointedly emphasized the negative impact of recent U.S. military and economic aid to Lon Nol, implicitly utilizing this factor as a rationale for the prevailing stalemate on the Cambodian battlefield.

Sihanouk remained firm on the settlement issue, noting in the communique the Front's determination to achieve its March 1970 five points, and denouncing the Phnom Penh leaders as traitors.

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On the 12th, Sihanouk was particularly blunt in assailing alleged Nixon Administration peace maneuvers, stressing in a possible allusion to his backers in Peking and Moscow that the Nixon Administration has persuaded an "impressive number of friendly governments" to influence the Front to negotiate with Lon Nol and to reduce its "bellicosity." Sihanouk earlier indirectly criticized the consequences of East-West detente while painting a gloomy picture of the three Indochinese allies fighting dauntlessly but in isolation against a powerful and obstinate U.S. imperialism. He pointedly compared the Indochinese sacrifices with the fact that "other countries--much bigger, richer, more developed in all respects and much better armed than ours--have preferred and still prefer to compromise with this imperialism or even kneel down before it, if not literally throwing themselves into its arms." Sihanouk duly rejected the Nixon Administration's plans for an "American peace" in Cambodia, reiterating that if negotiations take place they would be between him and the United States, not the Lon Nol regime, and that peace would be restored on condition the United States dismantled its "neocolonialist system" and completely withdrew.

FOREIGN SUPPORT Sihanouk's stopover in Hanoi was treated in a low key by Vietnamese media, continuing the DRV's public reticence on Cambodia since last year. The prince was greeted as usual by high-level officials including Truong Chinh and Pham Van Dong, and the latter hosted a banquet in his honor on the 17th. However, Vietnamese media did not replay the usual texts of Sihanouk and Dong speeches at the banquet and VNA excerpts of Dong's speech contained only a general pledge of support for the Front struggle and made no mention of the settlement issue, support for the five points, or criticism of Lon Nol.

Peking gave low-level coverage of Sihanouk's journey to Laos and Vietnam, carefully avoided replaying remarks that might be construed as critical of PRC rapprochement with the United States. Moscow mentioned the trip in a one-sentence TASS report on the 16th noting Sihanouk's arrival in Hanoi after touring Laos.

PRG, DRV REQUEST INTERNATIONAL CENSURE OF U.S. AID FOR GVN

The PRG, followed by Hanoi, has sought to elicit international opposition to the recent U.S. shipment of F-5E jets to South Vietnam to begin replacing the GVN's F-5A's. The 13 March delivery of the first four F-5E's prompted a protest from the

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PRG's Paris spokesman the following day and on the 16th was assailed in a PRG Foreign Ministry note addressed to the USSR, China, Poland, Hungary, France, Britain, Indonesia, the United States, and UN Secretary General Waldheim--all participants in the 1973 international conference on Vietnam--and to Iran as the new ICCS member.* The transfer of planes also drew a note to the ICCS from the PRG's military delegation on the Joint Military Commission.

Hanoi issued an initial protest about the F-5E's in a 15 March foreign ministry spokesman's statement and then followed up the PRG Foreign Ministry note with a note of its own. Earlier, the Administration's intention to supply the GVN with 150 F-5E's had been condemned in passing by Hanoi on 1 March in a similar note and in a 4 February spokesman's statement, and by the PRG in a 5 February foreign ministry statement assailing U.S. involvement in Vietnam.

The 16 March PRG Foreign Ministry note, publicized by Liberation Radio and LPA on the 18th, repeated standard communist charges that the United States has maintained U.S. military personnel in South Vietnam and "illegally" supplied Saigon with war materiel. It focused, however, on the delivery of the F-5E's, declaring that this "dangerous action" was in violation of the Paris agreement and reflected U.S. disregard for PRG "warnings." Claiming that the U.S. action demonstrated a U.S. intention to encourage GVN "military adventures," the note stated: "As a result, the situation in South Vietnam is fraught with the hazard of extremely dangerous developments." The last previous PRG note, on 2 March, had used less extravagant language, warning that continued U.S. encouragement and assistance for Saigon would create a "more serious" situation in South Vietnam. The current note calls upon its recipients to condemn and demand an end to U.S. involvement and aid for South Vietnam; a similar standard appeal had not been included in the PRG note two weeks earlier.

The dispatch of the DRV note was briefly reported by VNA on 20 March. The DRV's note to the UN Secretary General had been earlier transmitted in VNA's point-to-point circuit to Paris on 18 March, after the release of the PRG note. Judging by these reports, Hanoi typically used softer language than the PRG in

* The last such PRG note was issued on 2 March, following a similar DRV note the day before, and marked the anniversary of the international conference. See the TRENDS of 6 March 1974, pages 11-12, for background on previous notes.

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warning that the United States must bear full responsibility for "all serious consequences" arising from its "violations" of the agreement. However, the DRV went further than the PRG in calling for international action: VNA quotes the DRV note as asking the signatories to the Act of the international conference and members of the ICCS to take measures to "make the U.S. Government" immediately take the planes out of Vietnam.

"ANTI-U.S. DAY" PROMPTS NFLSV-PRG APPEAL, EDITORIAL COMMENT

The anniversary of anti-U.S. demonstrations in Saigon on 19 March 1950, marked each year by the Vietnamese communists as "Anti-U.S. Day," received special attention from the NFLSV and PRG this year. For the first time since the 20th anti-U.S. day anniversary in 1970, the NFLSV-PRG issued a joint appeal calling for action by different elements in South Vietnam and underlining hostility toward the United States. The 19 March appeal declared that in dealing with the United States the "only way to survive is to struggle, and the only method to resist their counterrevolutionary force is to use revolutionary force." It warned that the United States is "waiting for our people to slacken their vigilance for a minute," to fail to "grasp political and armed struggle, and fail to maintain their continuity and initiative in counteroffensive and offensive" so it can unleash its "gigantic mass of iron and steel in an attempt to threaten us, repress our people's struggle, and destroy the revolutionary gains we have achieved."

In an implicit slap at the Vietnamese communists' allies, the appeal stressed that the Vietnamese have consistently recognized more clearly than anyone else the true nature of the United States. It maintained that the Vietnamese were "well aware of the aggressive designs of the U.S. imperialists" even in 1950 when they had "concealed their real face with a smokescreen of political deception" and become "a virtual idol to be worshiped as a result of their terrible power." The appeal also accused the United States of currently "resorting to many perfidious and crafty political and diplomatic maneuvers in an attempt to isolate and divide us and deprive us of the support of friendly countries, thereby creating conditions for encircling and strangling the southern revolution."

Other PRG comment on the anniversary included an LPA editorial, broadcast by Liberation Radio, which made an unusual allusion to the timing of the South Vietnamese struggle. It suggested that the achievement of victory "cannot be calculated in terms of months or years" nor can it "drag on indefinitely."

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Hanoi marked the anti-U.S. anniversary with radio and press comment, including a NHAN DAN editorial decrying U.S. policies and concluding that "the chief enemies of our people in the new stage are the U.S. imperialists and the bourgeois, comprador, bureaucratic, militarist, and fascist ruling clique." The editorial demanded routinely that the United States end its involvement in Vietnam and carry out other aspects of the Paris agreement. This year's editorial did not include the optimistic note contained in NHAN DAN's anniversary editorial last year, which had suggested such a course would lead to normal U.S.-DRV relations and an end to the confrontation between the two countries.

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CHINA

PEOPLE'S DAILY EDITORIAL STRESSES NEED TO SAVE ERRANT CADRES

A terse 15 March PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial has taken a step further the moderate guidelines on criticizing Lin Piao and Confucius--set forth in the last such editorial on 20 February--and cautioned that even those cadres found guilty of "serious mistakes" should be saved. The editorial failed to give any clear indication who the errant cadres might be, noting only that "reactionaries" are now trying to undermine the anti-Confucius campaign. Focusing almost entirely on the need for greater criticism of the slogan "restrain oneself and restore the rites," a phrase allegedly used by Lin and his followers in their attempt to usurp party leadership and seize state power, the editorial urged that those who have gone astray be helped to "change their stand and return" to Mao's revolutionary line.

Thus far, three PEOPLE'S DAILY editorials have been released delineating the separate stages in the course of the nationwide "people's war" against Lin and Confucius. The 2 February editorial fused the two separate struggles against Lin and Confucius into one national campaign and declared that the new drive would be a "test for every leading comrade." This warning to cadres was dropped in the moderating 20 February editorial, which emphasized that the party has full organizational control over the campaign and that "we should have confidence" that leading comrades will be able "to maintain the general orientation of the struggle." The 15 March editorial is the first to acknowledge that "comrades in our ranks" have committed mistakes, and it maintains the campaign's moderate course of recent weeks by stressing that those guilty of shortcomings should learn from their past mistakes and avoid future ones.

IDEOLOGICAL CAMPAIGN SHIFTS ATTENTION TO CULTURAL SCENE

Following the 20 February PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial injunction restricting the scope of the anti-Confucius and Lin Piao campaign, the focus has shifted to the cultural arena and away from sensitive issues that for a time had received much attention in PRC media. The increased attention to cultural issues presumably is gratifying to PLA cadres, who implicitly had been a major target of criticism, and has

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brought Chiang Ching back into prominence, albeit in a limited sphere. The 20 February editorial's injunction, "be careful not to let criticism of Lin Piao and Confucius become entangled with other problems or be blurred by them," evidently had a direct effect in suppressing further discussion of issues such as cadres gaining favors "through the back door," a theme that now has virtually disappeared from the media.

The anti-Confucius campaign's new focus on culture and its accompanying move toward naming active officials as targets of the campaign came on 28 February, when a PEOPLE'S DAILY article by Chu Lan designated the Shansi opera "Three Visits to Taofeng" a "bad" opera, and two provincial radios--Kiangsi and Shantung--attacked the opera "Turbulent Beach," also called "Case No. 302."* Since then nearly every province has publicized local criticisms of "Three Visits," some indicating that it had been performed locally.

The 28 February Kiangsi opera criticism and a broadcast on the same day by the Heilungkiang provincial radio also contained this year's first monitored references in open media to Chiang Ching's cultural role, though the limited circulation Shanghai STUDY AND CRITICISM referred to her in its January issue. And on 11 March, for the first time in nearly a year, PEOPLE'S DAILY praised Chiang's role in creating the model operas.

The current criticism campaign seems designed to show that cultural leaders in a number of provinces have been guilty of fostering works that conflict with Chiang Ching's directives, and that these officials did not operate purely on a regional basis but were active throughout much of China. A 10 March Shihchiachuang radio broadcast, for instance, carried a HOPEI DAILY editor's note which stated that not only had both "Turbulent Beach" and "Three Visits" been performed locally, but that "Three Visits" had also been adapted as "a Hopei drama, Honan opera, and Peking opera by some literary and art groups."

The appearance of bad operas in various parts of China suggests that eventually a central leader will be designated as a target of the campaign. A 15 March Shantung broadcast

* For details, see the 6 March TRENDS, page 18.

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came near to stating this point directly when it noted that "Turbulent Beach" had become a pernicious influence throughout the country and that it was produced with the "direct support of someone." Below the Politburo level, there are a number of possible targets on the cultural scene, such as aged scholar Kuo Mo-jo, or state cultural group deputy chief Liu Hsien-chuan, whose Tsinghai home base is among those noting that "Three Visits" was performed locally. On the Politburo level, cultural group chief Wu Te and Chiang Ching now seem unlikely targets; both have been making regular public appearances recently. Since 21 February Chiang has appeared three times at public functions, each time in the company of Chou En-lai. The only other Politburo member known to be deeply involved in cultural affairs in recent years is Yao Wen-yuan, whose article attacking the play "Hai Jui" was the catalyst which set off the cultural revolution. While Yao has usually been thought of as Chiang's protege, and it seems unlikely he would have actually mounted a cultural attack in opposition to her wishes, he has not made any public appearances since 6 November and his public profile has been much reduced since he lost status relative to many of his Politburo peers at the 10th party congress.

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U S S R

BREZHNEV ASSERTS PERSONAL LEADERSHIP OF AGRICULTURE

Brezhnev spoke about agricultural policy with new authority and unusual candor in his 15 March Alma-Ata speech on the 20th anniversary of the virgin lands. In passages reminiscent of Khrushchev's informal and confident style, Brezhnev gave the impression that he often makes independent decisions in this sector in talks with local leaders. Other officials have in recent months increasingly dropped any pretense of collectivity and have attributed decisions to Brezhnev personally. This viewpoint was reflected in a January QUESTIONS OF PHILOSOPHY article by PRAVDA first deputy editor V. G. Afanasyev, who quoted Lenin as demanding a "necessary minimum of collegiality" while reserving the final decision for the leader--"one comrade, known for his firmness, decisiveness, boldness, ability to conduct practical affairs, and enjoying the greatest confidence."

In his Alma-Ata speech Brezhnev described a recent talk with Kazakh First Secretary and Politburo member Kunayev during which, based on his own knowledge of livestock raising, he had badgered Kunayev into promising to expand Kazakhstan's sheep herds from 32 million to 50 million. He jokingly warned Kunayev not to fall short "even one sheep." He also described a talk with a Mari obkom secretary on agricultural reorganization, proposed that Kazakh leaders change their Pavlodar tractor plant to production of larger tractors, warned agricultural leaders against forcing organizational changes too fast, praised former virgin land leader Fedor Morgun's book about the virgin lands, and endorsed Ukrainian farmer Aleksandr Gitalov's criticism of present livestock raising machinery. Further, he declared that he would try to prod leaders of the cotton-producing republics into taking on higher cotton production goals.

Brezhnev had displayed his authority earlier, at a September 1973 Tashkent meeting of these leaders, where he pushed them to raise their targets and, according to the live radio coverage of his 24 September speech, jokingly warned Uzbek First Secretary Rashidov not to try to back out of his pledge. Turkmen Premier O. N. Orazmukhamedov revealed in the December 1973 Supreme Soviet session that at the September meeting Brezhnev had ordered the cotton-producing republics to expand cotton sowing by one million hectares in the next few years.

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Brezhnev's personal role in agriculture has become increasingly evident as more and more specific agricultural decisions are credited to him and more public references are made to his behind-the-scenes activity. First Deputy Premier Mazurov, at a July 1973 Supreme Soviet session, attributed a new Central Committee and Council of Ministers decree aiding rural schools to Brezhnev's initiative, while Premier Kosygin in his 13 November Minsk speech stated that during discussion of the 1973 proposed plan it was Brezhnev who had proposed initiating the successful nationwide competition to raise labor productivity. According to the 23 November LENINGRAD PRAVDA, Leningrad First Secretary Romanov declared that "all work" in designing the new, larger K-701 tractor and in remodeling the Leningrad Kirov plant to produce it "is being conducted with the direct help" of Brezhnev. At a local meeting reported in the 16 February LENINGRAD PRAVDA, a plant party official described the enormity of the remodeling, indicating it would cost 26 million rubles in 1974 alone.

At the December Supreme Soviet session a Kostroma kolkhoz member declared that the new ministry of machine building for livestock raising and fodder production, created last October, had been proposed by Brezhnev. Also at the December session, Turkmen Second Secretary V. N. Rykov stated that "on the initiative" of Brezhnev proposals were under consideration to increase irrigation and land improvement work. This apparently was the beginning of the 35-billion ruble program of land improvement for northern and central Russia revealed by Brezhnev in his Alma-Ata speech. Press reports in January and February continued to give Brezhnev personal credit for initiating various agricultural and industrial programs.

In addition, leaders of the RSFSR, Kazakhstan, and Georgia have referred to Brezhnev's personal instructions to them on agricultural questions, and the Politburo's agricultural managers--Polyanskiy and Kulakov--have both stressed Brezhnev's personal involvement in agricultural decisions. In a speech reported in the 13 October RURAL LIFE, Polyanskiy noted Brezhnev's "huge" attention to agriculture, while in a Baku speech reported in the 19 January BAKINSKIY RABOCHIY Kulakov spoke of Brezhnev's "daily practical advice, recommendations, and instructions to party organizations" on agricultural questions.

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NOTES

WORLD PARTY CONFERENCE: The quest for a new Moscow-sponsored international conference of communist parties was given new high-level endorsement in speeches by Czechoslovakia's Husak and Poland's Gierk at a 14 March rally climaxing Husak's four-day visit to Warsaw and in the final communique issued the next day, all promptly reported by TASS. The communique recorded the two leaders' agreement that "conditions have ripened for convening" a meeting of European CP's and "starting preparations for" a world party conference. Both the speeches and the communique included attacks on "Maoism." The Polish and Czechoslovak parties had already been put on record as favoring a world conference by lower ranking leaders in December and January, respectively. The planned conference has so far been publicly endorsed by Moscow's five orthodox East Europe allies and, among others, the West German DKP and the Portuguese, Austrian, Canadian, Finnish, U.S., Luxembourg, Paraguayan, Peruvian, and Lebanese CP's.

TITO'S HEALTH: Yugoslav media since 9 March have carried a spate of reports on Tito's official activities that portray him as an active, alert leader on top of his job. The 9 March appointments—chairing a session of the LCY Executive Bureau and receiving Premier Bijedic and another state official before their departures for trips abroad—were his first reported official activities since he saw Mexican President Echeverria off at Belgrade airport on 15 February. Also on 15 February TANJUG had announced that Tito's visit to Hungary, scheduled for 17-18 February, had "been postponed for a little while at the agreement of both sides." The only official indication of his physical indisposition was a 1 March TANJUG report that he was "spending a short rest at Karadjordjevo on the advice of his doctors." In his latest appointment Tito received two high LCY officials on the 18th. Neither Belgrade nor Sofia media have confirmed a 17 March Vienna radio report that a visit to Belgrade by Bulgarian leader Zhivkov, scheduled for the 21st, had been cancelled because of Tito's health.

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APPENDIX

MOSCOW, PEKING BROADCAST STATISTICS 11 - 17 MARCH 1974

<u>Moscow (2849 items)</u>			<u>Peking (1119 items)</u>		
Pompidou "Working"	(2%)	25%	Criticism of Lin Piao and Confucius	(11%)	12%
Visit to USSR			Kuwait National Assembly Speaker al-Ghunaym in PRC	(--)	4%
[Brezhnev Interview With French Newsmen]	(1%)	6%]	Australian CP(M-L) 10th Anniversary	(--)	4%
[Report on Talks Soviet Party-Government "Approval"]	(--)	5%]	Indochina Geneva Conference on Humanitarian Law	(3%)	3%
[Soviet Party-Government "Approval"]	(--)	4%]		(6%)	3%
Virgin Land Development, 20th Anniversary	(--)	12%			
[Brezhnev Alma-Ata Speech]	(--)	7%]			
China	(6%)	5%			
Arab-Israeli Issue	(13%)	3%			

These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used to denote the lengthy item—radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, government or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are counted as commentaries.

Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.

Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues; in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.